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ABSTRACT  9 
Although Oil and Gas Pipelines (OGPs) are a safe and economical mode of transportation of 10 
petroleum products around the world, they face challenges caused by risk factors including 11 
safety, security, design, construction and operational risks due to Third Party Disruption (TPD) 12 
and acts of terrorism, particularly in developing and unstable countries like Iraq. A lack of 13 
knowledge about managing such risks and the scarcity of past data about pipeline failures, are 14 
hindering OGP risk management systems. This paper, therefore, focuses on identifying and 15 
analyzing the risks caused by TDP in order to develop a holistic Risk Management Model 16 
(RMM). A semi-structured questionnaire was designed, using 30 risk factors identified through 17 
a comprehensive literature review, distributed to OGP stakeholders in Iraq, via an online survey 18 
tool, to collect the research data. SPSS was used to analyze the data and evaluate risk factors 19 
which were ranked in order of probability and severity level using a risk index method. A 20 
conceptual framework for the RMM is presented, based on the literature review and survey 21 
findings. The results reveal that terrorism, sabotage and theft are the most critical safety risks, 22 
official corruption and lawlessness the most influential factors for regulatory risks. Pipeline 23 
location “Hot-Zones” also have a serious impact on the failure of pipelines. A computer-based 24 
risk management model will be developed at the next stage of the study using the RMM and 25 
the results of the numerical risk analysis. 26 
 27 
Keywords- Pipelines; risk evaluation; risk management model; safety risk and third-party 28 
disruption. 29 
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1. Introduction 30 
Oil and gas pipelines (OGPs) are considered a safe and economical mode of petroleum product 31 
transportation, however they are subject to a range of hazards and accidental damage that have 32 
severe consequences on projects and people’s lives. Long-distance pipelines mainly suffer 33 
from mechanical, operational and natural hazards [1], design flaws, misuse, corrosion damage 34 
and third-party disruption (TPD) [2]. Muhlbauer [3] defines TPD as any individual or group 35 
action that obstructs the functionality of the infrastructures’ systems in any direct or indirect 36 
manner. Peng et al. [4] add any action that accidentally damages OGPs, such as human error, 37 
natural phenomena, soil movement (e.g. foundation collapse, landslides, floods and mudslides), 38 
and surface loads as a result of illegal building, blast construction and live ground loads that 39 
compress pipelines. In this paper, TPD refers to all individual and group actions that result in 40 
expected or unexpected pipeline damage, at any stage of the pipeline project. At the present 41 
time, globally insecure situations are adding more cause for concern and potentially serious 42 
consequences to OGP projects. This is especially the case in countries with low levels of 43 
security where OGPs often suffer malicious terrorist attacks. Such hazardous environments 44 
make OGP risk management challenging and complex. 45 
OGP projects are complex and risky but crucial. Consequently, the risk management challenges 46 
and difficulties facing OGPs are increasing day by day due to the vast range of problems that 47 
are facing pipeline projects because of an unstable global environment. Proper attention needs 48 
to be given to OGP risk factors because neglecting these will result in casualties in terms of 49 
disturbance to business activities and economic losses. In the OGP risk management field, 50 
problems related to proper understanding, data availability and risk evaluation facilities have 51 
been noticed, particularly in developing and unstable countries like Iraq. This implies that risk 52 
management studies must be conducted and translated into formats that can be reviewed, 53 
understood and analyzed in order to maintain safe and secure construction and operational 54 
environments [5]. 55 
Even though risks to OGPs cannot be entirely avoided, dealing with each risk as severe is 56 
resulting in losses in expenditure [6] and time. Reasonable and accurate risk evaluation 57 
measures can contribute to a reduction in the overall risk of pipeline failure [2]. Risk 58 
management works to control risk factors and minimize risk impact, this process including four 59 
steps: (i) risk identification; (ii) risk analysis; (iii) risk response and mitigation, and (iv) risk 60 
monitoring and control [7]. Step 1, risk identification, is carried out to identify the factors that 61 
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affect OGP project success, both positively and negatively. This step is fundamental because 62 
risk management is based on the premise that risk factors are identifiable as defending a system 63 
from unknown risk is almost impossible [8]. Step 2, risk analysis, is about evaluating the 64 
influence of identified risk factors on the project in terms of the chances of it happening, 65 
frequency or likelihood, severity and the degree of impact. Both risk identification and analysis 66 
depend on an appropriate and accurate knowledge base and real data as these provide the 67 
required level of input for a successful risk evaluation [9]. In order to prioritize hazards that 68 
need managerial attention, risk registers should contain all analyzed risks [10,11]. Because of 69 
this, the current trend in risk management is to take a holistic and comprehensive approach to 70 
projects [12], ensuring that adequate ‘risk registration’ and ‘risk assessment’ facilities are 71 
available for effective risk evaluation. Step 3, risk response and mitigation, are about how to 72 
respond to risk and choose actions that will reduce hazards and minimize consequences. Step 73 
4, risk monitoring and control, are continuous processes carried out to identify and analyze new 74 
risk factors, re-evaluate current risk factors and improve existing risk responses to ensure 75 
adequate risk management. 76 
Existing OGP risk management studies (for details see Table 1) do not focus on all types of 77 
risk factors at a time, despite the fact that there are many different types of risks which can 78 
affect the OGP. This is especially the case in countries where OGPs face unique risks due to 79 
TPD, sabotage, acts of terrorism, civil war and rules and regulations. These risk factors have 80 
not been effectively studied to date. While accurate risk factor probability and severity values 81 
are required to manage OGP risks, these values are still imprecise, deficient and vague [13] 82 
meaning that current analytical methods cannot calculate the probability and severity of TPD 83 
and other similar factors.  84 
One of the reasons why it is difficult to manage risk more effectively is because a historical 85 
database has not yet been established [4,14]. This implies that current OGP risk evaluation 86 
studies and tools are inadequate due to the lack of an acceptable knowledge base and a lack of 87 
data. This situation is causing significant challenges for developing and unstable countries like 88 
Iraq, as well as general issues around less effective OGP risk management systems. There is, 89 
therefore, a vital and urgent need for an effective risk analysis study that can help to identify 90 
and analyze OGP risk factors in a more effective way.  91 
This study, therefore, aims to provide a thorough review about the risk factors applicable to 92 
OGPs in countries where these projects are suffering severe consequences from terrorist attacks 93 
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and sabotage in addition to other risk factors. The main objective is to identify and analyze the 94 
risk factors specific to Iraq. In doing so, it will address the current shortage of data and provide 95 
relevant information for OGP risk management studies, such as a list of risk factors and the 96 
degree to which they influence pipelines. This paper will actively contribute to the field of OGP 97 
risk management in Iraq and other countries that are suffering the same kinds of risks, through 98 
the provision of real data about pipeline failure based on OGPs stakeholders’ perceptions that 99 
reflect the reality of the problem. Moreover, the evaluation of the impact of each risk is a 100 
fundamental step for any risk management study.  101 
Moving forwards, this paper has been organized as follows. The methodology, risk factors 102 
identification, data collection and questionnaire development are described in section 2. 103 
Section 3 presents the results, section 4 the discussion and section 5 the conclusion moreover, 104 
the evaluation of the impact of each on and suggestions for future research.  105 
 106 
2. Methodology  107 
A pragmatist paradigm is adopted to obtain meaningful results from both the qualitative and 108 
quantitative approaches used in this research. The methodology that has been followed in this 109 
research is based on a holistic framework of a Risk Management Model (RMM), which has 110 
three phases as illustrated in Fig. 1. Phase I is about identifying OGP risk factors through an 111 
available database or through a review of the previous literature, if there is no database 112 
available. This phase could help researchers overcome the problems caused by the shortage of 113 
available data. The findings from Phase I will be presented in Table 1. Phase II is about risk 114 
analysis and data gathering. In this phase, a questionnaire survey will be designed and 115 
distributed amongst OGPs stakeholders in Iraq to collect their perceptions about the probability 116 
and severity levels of OGPs risk factors. To determine the numerical values of Risk Probability 117 
(RP) and Risk Seventy (RS) descriptive statistical analyses are applied to the survey. Phase II 118 
results will be presented in Table 3. Finally, phase III is about simulating risk factors using a 119 
mathematical algorithm and computer-based model based on the findings from phases I and II. 120 
The developed RMM will allow a comprehensive and systematic approach to OGP risk 121 
identification and evaluation, specifically for governments or organizations at the beginning of 122 
their management efforts in terms of risk factor identification, data registration and systematic 123 
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risk management. In this research, moreover, a new database will be created to store the 124 
findings and recommendations from this research to be used for future research.    125 
 126 
Figure 1:  The Framework of the RMM. 127 
 128 
Following the design of the RMM, section 2.1 details the process for phase I, sections 2.2 to 129 
3.3 the process for phase II, and section 5  explains future work (phase III).   130 
2.1. Risk factor identification 131 
In Iraq, and other developing countries under similar situations, OGP risk management is 132 
hampered by a shortage of data. To overcome this problem, a comprehensive document 133 
analysis has been carried out here to identify the common causes of pipeline failure in different 134 
countries, and under different circumstances, around the world. Pipeline risk factors at the 135 
planning, design, construction, operation and maintenance stages have been identified, 136 
classified by type and listed in Table 1. 137 
 138 
 139 
Table 1: Critical OGP risk factors from the reviewed literature. 140 
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Risk Factors Author Risk Type 
Socio-political factors such as education level and poverty  [2,9,15-17] Security and societal (S&S) 
Low levels of the general publics’ legal and moral 
awareness 
[4,18] S&S 
Thieves [16,17] S&S 
Terrorism and sabotage [9,15-17,18-20] S&S 
Threats to staff (kidnap and/or murder) [21] S&S 
Leakage of sensitive information [6,22] S&S 
Geographical location like ‘Hot-Zones’ [6] Pipeline location (PL) 
Conflict over land ownership [23,24] PL 
Accessibility of pipelines [6] PL 
Geological risks like soil movement and landslides   [2,15,25] PL 
Vehicle accidents [4] PL 
Animal accidents [15,21] PL 
Lack of compliance with the safety regulations [2, 16]  Health & safety and 
environment (HSE) 
Non-availability of warning signs [2,26] HSE 
Lack of proper maintenance and regular inspection  [2,9,5,11,16,20] HSE 
The opportunity to sabotage exposed pipelines  [21] HSE 
Inadequate risk management methods [5,16] HSE 
Natural disasters and weather conditions [9,15-17] HSE 
Weak ability to identify and monitor the risk factors [16]  Operational constraints (OC) 
Shortage of high-quality and modern IT services [15,16] OC 
Corrosion and lack of anti-corrosive action [2,6,11,16,19, 20,25] OC 
Design, construction, material and manufacturing defects [2,11,19,20,25,27] OC 
Operational errors e.g. human error and equipment failure  [2,5,11,15,16,19,20] OC 
Hacker attacks on the operating or control systems [6] OC 
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The law not applying to saboteurs (lawlessness) [4,15]  Rules and regulations (R&R) 
Stakeholders are not paying proper attention [16] R&R 
Few researchers are dealing with this problem [16] R&R 
Lack of historical records about accidents and risk 
registration 
[5,16] R&R 
Lack of proper training schemes [5,16] R&R 
Corruption [16] R&R 
 141 
30 risk factors have been identified and classified into five types as follows: (i) Security and 142 
societal. This type of risk includes terrorism and sabotage; thieves; public, legal and moral 143 
awareness; socio-political dimensions such as education level and poverty; threats to staff, and 144 
leakage of sensitive information about risks. (ii) Pipeline location. This includes risk factors 145 
like "Hot-Zones"; easy access to pipelines; conflict over land ownership; geological risks such 146 
as groundwater and landslides, and vehicle and animal accidents. (iii) Health & Safety and 147 
Environment (HSE). This incorporates improper safety regulations; improper inspection and 148 
maintenance; sabotage opportunities due to pipelines that are exposed as laid above ground; 149 
limited warning signs; inadequate risk management, and natural disasters and weather 150 
conditions, and (iv) Operational constraints. This includes corrosion and a lack of protection 151 
against it; the weakened ability to identify and monitor threats; a shortage of IT services and 152 
modern equipment; design, construction and material defects; operational errors, and hacker 153 
attacks on the operating or control systems. (v) Rules and regulations covering corruption; laws 154 
which do not apply to saboteurs and thieves; a lack of attention paid to circumstances by 155 
stakeholders; a lack of proper training; a lack of historical and risk registration, and a paucity 156 
of research addressing these problems.  157 
2.2. Data collection and questionnaire development 158 
Risk factors are characteristically vague, random and uncertain often accommodating a more 159 
personal style of thinking, processing capability and cognition [2]. For these reasons, 160 
stakeholders' perceptions and observations are both valuable and vital when identifying the 161 
problems associated with OGPs and to evaluate risk factors. Stakeholders' perceptions are 162 
based on their actual experience and knowledge about OGPs, making them well qualified to 163 
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monitor existing pipeline risks. Therefore, a quantitative industrial survey has been carried out 164 
with stakeholders to analyze the probability and severity of risk factors in Iraq.  165 
An online questionnaire survey was used in this research because it is one of the most widely-166 
used methods of additional data collection, are easy to manage, quick and inexpensive [28]. 167 
The survey targets participants who have relevant experience with OGP projects such as 168 
consultants, planners and designers; construction, operating and maintenance workers; 169 
administrators; owners and clients, and researchers. There are however, some 170 
disadvantages/limitations associated with online services that could result in a low response 171 
rate such as a lack of accessibility to the internet, issues regarding computer literacy, web 172 
security and anonymity and knowledge about the website [29]. That said, authors like Bertot 173 
[30] and Czaja and Blair [29] have concluded that this kind of survey is the easiest form of data 174 
collection as real cooperation is provided via open-ended questions.  175 
Before carrying out the main survey, a pilot survey was conducted to assess the clarity of the 176 
survey and all questions which were found to be vague were revised or discarded. The revised 177 
survey was distributed via an online survey tool to OGP stakeholders in Iraq. To ensure a 178 
widespread distribution of the survey, the snowball sampling technique was applied [31,32] 179 
whereby the survey was initially distributed to a number of previously identified participants 180 
who were also asked to forward it to others until the required number of responses is reached 181 
[31]. This technique can help to collect data from a large number of participants. Participants 182 
were promised that their answers will be analyzed with confidentiality and anonymity. 183 
The survey includes 12 questions comprising 95 items in total. Questions 1 to 6 are discussed 184 
in this paper. Questions 7 to 12 are related to the future risk modelling work and simulation 185 
therefore, they are not included here. Questions 1, 2 and 3 concern the participant’s occupation, 186 
experience and level of education in relation to OGP projects. Questions 4 and 5 are multi-187 
choice, five-point Likert rating scales. Question 4 asks respondents to evaluate risk factors in 188 
order of probability of occurrence on a scale of 1 to 5 where (1) = rare, (2) = unlikely, (3) = 189 
possible, (4) = likely and (5) = almost certain. Question 5 asks participants to evaluate risk 190 
factors in order of severity on a similar scale where (1) = negligible, (2) = minor, (3) = moderate, 191 
(4) = major and (5) = catastrophic. Question 6 is a drop-down question to compare the five 192 
types of risk factors by ranking these types from 1 to 5 regarding their impact and consequences 193 
on OGPs.  194 
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3. Results 195 
3.1. Reliability and Validity 196 
To assess the questionnaire’s reliability, Cronbach’s alpha correlation coefficient (α) has been 197 
calculated to measure the reliability and average correlation, or internal consistency, of survey 198 
items [31, 33, and 34]. Different levels of reliability are required depending on the purpose and 199 
nature of the study. Pallant [35] recommends an alpha value of 0.7 as a minimum level of 200 
reliability.  201 
The α values are shown in Table 2 where it can be seen that all α values are well above the 202 
acceptable value of 0,7. In this paper, reliability testing was carried out for questions 4 and 5 203 
as these were rated on a Likert rating scale. Regarding individual questions, reliability testing 204 
is not applicable, as question 1, 2 and 3 are asking about demographic information and question 205 
6 is asking about participants’ personal opinions about ranking risk factors types where no scale 206 
is applicable.  207 
Table 2: α case processing summary. 208 
Case Processing Summary Total (N) Number of items Valid Excluded * α 
N % N % 
Question No. 4 194 30 194 100 194 0 0,918 
Question No. 5 194 30 194 100 194 0 0,863 
* List wise deletion based on all variables in the procedure [36]. 209 
3.2. Sample demographics  210 
194 responders completed the questionnaire. As shown in Fig. 2, a wide range of OGP 211 
stakeholders are represented in the sample.  212 
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 213 
3.3. Risk factors analysis and ranking 214 
 215 
RP and RS values have been calculated by determining the mean of the 5-point Likert rating 216 
scales. The RI value for each risk factor has been calculated using Eq. (1) [37-39].  217 
𝑅𝐼 = (𝑅𝑃 × 𝑅𝑆)/5                                                                                                                                     … (1) 218 
Based on the statistical analysis of survey, the risk factors have been ranked according to their 219 
values of RI as presented in Table 3.  220 
In Table 3, column 2 shows the probability of the risk factors and column 3 ranks the factors 221 
by their degree of probability. Column 4 shows the severity of the risk factors and column 5 222 
ranks the factors by their degree of severity. Column 6 shows the RI values for each risk factors. 223 
Regarding the rank of the risk factors, there are two columns of risk ranking, column 7 shows 224 
the overall ranking of risk factors and column 8 shows per type risk factors ranking. The 225 
ranking for each of the five types of risk factors is as follows: (I) Regarding S & S risk factors, 226 
the survey results revealed that terrorism and sabotage actions are the most critical risk factors. 227 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Occupatio
n 
Experienc
e 
Education 
Figure 2: Participants’ demographic information  
Where * means occupation, ** means experience and *** means level of education. 
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This is followed by theft; reduced legal and moral awareness by the public; threats to staff, 228 
socio-political factors such as education level and poverty, and leakage of sensitive information. 229 
(II) Regarding pipeline location risk factors, hot-zones are the riskiest, while animal accidents 230 
factor the lowest. The 2nd, 3rd, 4th and 5th factors are pipeline is easy to access, conflict over 231 
land ownership, geological risk and vehicle accidents, respectively. (III) HSE risk factors are 232 
ranked as follows: improper safety regulations; inadequate maintenance and inspection; 233 
pipelines above the ground and exposed; limited warning signs; the weak nature of risk 234 
management, and natural disaster and weather conditions. (IV) Corrosion is the major 235 
operational issue facing pipelines. This is followed by an inadequate ability to identify and 236 
monitor risk factors; limited availability of IT; design, construction and material defects, and 237 
operational constraints. Problems caused by hacker attacks on operating or control systems 238 
have the least impact on pipeline systems in Iraq. (V)  From R & R risks, corruption has the 239 
highest impact, the remaining rules and regulations factors ranked as the law does not apply to 240 
saboteurs and thieves; stakeholders are not paying proper attention; a lack of proper training; 241 
the lack of an accident database and historical records, and little research on this subject.  242 
 243 
Table 3: Risks factor probability, severity, index and ranking. 244 
Risk Factors RP R1 
*  
RS  R2 
*  
RI R3 
*  
R4 *  
Terrorism and sabotage 3,985 1 4,485 1 3,574 1 S&S 1 
Corruption 3,959 2 4,309 2 3,412 2 R&R 1 
Geographical location e.g. "Hot-Zones" 3,696 4 4,093 4 3,025 3 PL 1 
The law does not apply on the saboteurs and thieves 3,593 16 4,191 3 3,011 4 R&R 2 
Thieves 3,680 6 4,067 5 2,994 5 S&S 2 
Corrosion and lack of protection against it 3,691 5 3,979 6 2,937 6 OC 1 
Improper safety regulations 3,675 7 3,938 8 2,895 7 HSE 1 
Improper inspection and maintenance 3,649 10 3,923 9 2,863 8 HSE 2 
Low public legal and moral awareness 3,711 3 3,840 11 2,850 9 S&S 3 
Weak ability to identify and monitor the threats 3,624 12 3,876 10 2,809 10 OC 2 
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Stakeholders are not paying proper attention 3,521 18 3,943 7 2,777 11 R&R 3 
Lack of proper training 3,629 11 3,753 13 2,724 12 R&R 4 
The opportunity to sabotage exposed pipelines  3,655 9 3,665 16 2,679 13 HSE 3 
Shortage of IT services and modern equipment 3,660 8 3,634 19 2,660 14 OC 3 
Limited warning signs 3,624 13 3,665 17 2,656 15 HSE 4 
The pipeline is easy to access 3,608 15 3,639 18 2,626 16 PL 2 
Lack of historical and risk registration 3,552 17 3,696 15 2,625 17 R&R 5 
Little research on this topic 3,624 14 3,577 22 2,593 18 R&R 6 
Design, construction and material defects 3,320 21 3,830 12 2,543 19 OC 4 
Conflict over land ownership 3,474 19 3,598 20 2,500 20 PL 3 
Threats to staff 3,309 22 3,727 14 2,467 21 S&S 4 
Socio-political effects such as poverty and level of 
education 
3,428 20 3,397 24 2,329 22 S&S 5 
Operational errors 3,072 24 3,588 21 2,204 23 OC 5 
Inadequate risk management 3,206 23 3,387 25 2,172 24 HSE 5 
Leakage of sensitive information 2,964 25 3,485 23 2,066 25 S&S 6 
Geological risks such as groundwater and landslides 2,732 26 3,175 26 1,735 26 PL 4 
Natural disasters and weather conditions 2,639 27 3,057 27 1,613 27 HSE 6 
Vehicles accidents 2,443 28 2,706 29 1,322 28 PL 5 
Hacker attacks on the operating or control systems 2,227 29 2,948 28 1,313 29 OC 6 
Animals accidents 1,892 30 2,026 30 0,766 30 PL 6 
      *Where R1 = RP ranking, R2 = RS ranking, R3 = RI ranking and R4 = ranking per type.  245 
According to the survey results, the five types of risk factors have been ranked as follows. 246 
Security and social type is the most critical risk factor, followed by pipe location; HSE; rules 247 
and regulations and operational constraints, as presented in Table 4, where rank 1 represents 248 
the highest impact and 5 the lowest impact amongst risk factors types. 249 
 250 
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Table 4: The ranking of risk factors types.  251 
Risk factors type Mean Rank 
Security and societal factors  2,155 1 
Pipe location factors 2,634 2 
HSE factors 3,134 3 
Rules and regulations factors 3,536 4 
Operational constraints 3,541 5 
 252 
4. Discussion  253 
Iraq has an extensive pipeline network used to transport oil products for local consumption and 254 
for exports through ports and neighboring countries. To handle increases in oil production and 255 
exports, a substantial number of new pipelines have to be built, both inside and outside of Iraq. 256 
As well as, much of the existing pipelines are in need of repair and expansion [40]. At the same 257 
time, there is an urgent need for the country to overcome the many formidable challenges and 258 
risk factors that work to obstruct pipeline performance and the development of new projects 259 
[40, 41]. A risk index that identifies risk factors and evaluates the probability and severity of 260 
each risk is fundamental for risk management. Understanding and evaluating OGP risk factors 261 
will help stakeholders, decision makers, policymakers and researchers to adopt a sustainable 262 
risk management strategy during the different stages of pipeline projects.  263 
The holistic RMM framework developed here aims to support the identification, analyses and 264 
ranking of OGP risk factors more comprehensively and systematically. As such, this paper is 265 
based on an extensive literature review which serves as its foundation providing a 266 
comprehensive overview about OGP risk factors especially those in insecure environments.  267 
OGPs risk factors have been analyzed and ranked based on the real observations of the 268 
stakeholders. The RMM developed here provides a holistic and systematic approach to risk 269 
management. It also provides a new database that supplies the data essential for risk 270 
management processes, such as a potential list of risk factors and the probability and severity 271 
of these factors. This paper’s findings and recommendations are suitable and applicable for 272 
OGPs in Iraq and many other countries under similar situations. OGP stakeholders could use 273 
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this paper’s findings, specifically Tables 1 and 3 and Fig. 1, to improve risk management during 274 
the pipeline projects' stages. 275 
The questionnaire results were found to be reliable as all α values are above 0,7, as shown in 276 
Table 2. The demographic information about the 194 responders reflects the diversity of the 277 
sample, as shown in Fig. 2. This level of diversity means the questionnaire has reached the 278 
target population as all categories of stakeholder are represented. Correct sampling facilitates 279 
more realistic risk identification and enhances the results of the evaluation. The top risk factors 280 
in Table 3 indicate that terrorism and acts of theft are the first and fifth most pressing factors. 281 
Corruption is the second top risk factor, followed by geographical location e.g. "Hot-Zones" 282 
and law as not applicable to saboteurs and thieves, all of which are obstructing pipeline projects. 283 
Table 4 reveals that Iraqi OGP stakeholders are most concerned with security and societal risk 284 
factors, the geographical location of pipelines and HSE factors. To establish an effective OGP 285 
risk management approach in Iraq, stakeholders' perceptions are crucial to help identify and 286 
analyze OGP problems because they are based on real experience of pipeline projects and 287 
existing problems in the field. For these reasons, both the literature findings and survey results 288 
will provide a clearer understanding of OGP risk factors.  289 
 290 
5. Conclusion  291 
Risk management is a continuous process of risk identification, analysis, evaluation and risk 292 
response actions. Based on an extensive literature review, a list of thirty risk factors relevant to 293 
OGPs, were identified and used to design a questionnaire and conduct an industry-wide survey. 294 
A total of 194 participants were recruited using a snowball approach, the risk factors ranked 295 
based on RP, RS and RI values. The results indicated that the risk factors with the highest 296 
impact are terrorism and sabotage, corruption, "Hot-Zones", lawlessness regarding saboteurs, 297 
and thieves. Geological risks, natural disasters and weather conditions, hacker attacks on 298 
operating and/or control systems, and vehicle and animal accidents are the risk factors with the 299 
least impact. The results of the statistical analysis show that the TPD is mostly responsible for 300 
OGP failure in Iraq. It is concluded that TPD should be given priority in order to mitigate and 301 
limit damage to OGPs in Iraq. 302 
The findings support OGP risk management systems specifically in developing and unstable 303 
countries like Iraq. OGP stakeholders could use the results provided in Tables 1, 3 and 4, as a 304 
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database to overcome the problem of data availability, using the research as a risk evaluation 305 
tool for monitoring and prioritizing risks during design, re-design, construction, operation, 306 
inspection and maintenance activities. 307 
Looking to the future, this paper presents the initial findings of a PhD research which mainly 308 
focuses on identifying and analyzing the risks associated with OGPs and to present the initial 309 
framework for an RMM. These findings will be used to develop a computer based risk 310 
management model in the next stage of study, where the numerical results will be used as key 311 
input for the model. 312 
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